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By PAUL N. BOWLES*
INTRODUCTION
While the focus of this Article is on issues involving adverse
possession of subsurface minerals, the principles generally appli-
cable to adverse possession of real estate must be examined and
stated so that they can be related to cases of adverse possession of
subsurface minerals. This Article is not limited to cases and other
authorities from the eastern part of the United States, but au-
thorities from that area are emphasized.
I. ADVERSE POSSESSION GENERALLY
Acquisition of good title to real estate by operation of the
laws of adverse possession has a long history, and the basic prin-
ciples are well settled in this country.' When all requirements
have been satisfied,2 the net effect is to extinguish the title of the
true owner and vest a new title in the adverse claimant. 3 In order
to claim title, the adverse claimant must do acts of such a nature
and for such a period of time4 as will put the true owner on notice
Partner in the firm of Bowles, McDavid, Graff & Love, Charleston, West Vir-
ginia. LL.B. 1949, West Virginia University.
1 See, e.g., Knott Coal Corp. v. Kelly, 417 S.W.2d 253, 253-57 (Ky. 1967); Bigham
v. Wenschhof, 441 A.2d 391, 391-93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Morgan v. DUllard, 456
S.W.2d 359,359-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
2 See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Candelaria, 403 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir.
1968); Barrs v. Zukowski, 169 A.2d 23,27 (Conn. 1961); Porter v. Posey, 592 S.W.2d 844,
849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
3 See Heam v. Leverette, 99 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Ga. 1957); Russell v. Russell, 540
S.W.2d 626, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Calvert v. Murphy, 81 S.E. 403, 404 (W. Va.
1914); Marky Investment, Inc. v. Arnezeder, 112 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Wis. 1961).
4 Basic to the laws of adverse possession in any jurisdiction are the provisions of the
statute of limitations applicable to causes of action to obtain possession of real estate or to
oust one who possesses but does not do so under the true owner's title. See, e.g., Somon v.
Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., 232 S.E.2d 524, 528 (W. Va. 1977) (citing W. VA.
CODE S 55-2-1, which at the time of the decision, as well as at present, set the statute of
limitations for the recovery of real property at 10 years). Since these laws vary from state
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that the adverse party is claiming ownership of the real estate.
These acts must give the true owner a possessory cause of action
against the claimant throughout a period of time equal to that
provided for in the applicable statute of limitations. 5
In all cases there must be some actual possession of the sub-
ject real estate by the adverse claimant.6 The actual possession
must be open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and hostile to the
true owner's title and ownership.7 There must be physical, on the
ground occupancy or use of the land consistent with a claim of
ownership. 8 If possession is confined to the surface only, it must
evidence incidents of ownership, such as constructing and using
improvements made on the surface, fencing, farming, grazing
livestock, cutting timber and like activities. 9 If the possession and
claim of ownership are limited to minerals only, as may be the
case where the surface and mineral titles have been severed, then
the minerals must be physically possessed in such a manner and
to an extent so as to amount to commercial production of the
mineral or minerals.10
The possession, to be adverse, also must be open, visible and
notorious, so that the true owner is charged with notice that
someone is exercising incidents of ownership that are inconsistent
to state as to time and other requirements, and some states have special statutes or consti-
tutional provisions not applicable generally, no attempt is made in this Article to explain
variations unless they are necessary to explain a holding or opinion in a particular case or
line of cases.
5 See Noland v. Wise, 259 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. 1953); Walton v. Rosson, 222 S.E.2d
553, 556 (Va. 1976); Kline v. Kramer, 386 N.E.2d 982, 988-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
6 Cowherd v. Brooks, 456 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky. 1970); Flickinger v. Huston, 435
A.2d 190. 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Somon v. Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., 232
S.E.2d at 528.
7 Creech v. Miniard, 408 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Ky. 1966); Stephenson Lumber Co. v.
Hurst, 83 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Ky. 1934); Jones v. Vandevolt, 193 N.E.2d 92, 93 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1962); Nevling v. Natoli, 434 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super Ct. 1981).
8 Hasty v. Wilson, 158 S.E.2d 915, 919 (Ga. 1967); Stephens v. Kidd, 181 S.W.2d
688, 689 (Ky. 1944); Goen v. Sansbury, 149 A.2d 17, 20-21 (Md. 1959).
9 Kubiszyn v. Bradley, 298 So. 2d 9, 13 (Ala. 1974) (fence, cutting timber, cultiva-
tion); Walden v. Baker, 343 S.W.2d 797, 798-99 (Ky. 1961) (improvements, fence, gar-
den); Albert v. Declue, 526 S.W.2d 39,40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (fence).
10 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1950); 417 S.W.2d at
256; Brockman v. Jones, 610 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Mountain Mission
School, Inc. v. Buchanan Realty Corp., 151 S.E.2d 403, 407 (Va. 1966); Putnam Co. v.
Fisher, 36 S.E.2d 681, 690 (W. Va. 1945). See Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.430 (Bobbs-Merrill
1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS]; W. VA. CODE § 55-2-la (1981).
ADVERSE POSSESSION
with the true owner's title." The acts must in fact be hostile to
the true owner and be done without the true owner's permission
and without a recognition of the true owner's title.12
Possession must be exclusively that of the adverse claimant
and free of possession by the true owner or any-others who do not
claim by or through the adverse claimant.13 This exclusiveness of
possession is of particular importance when the adverse claimant
must rely upon constructive possession to extend the scope of his
or her actual possession and to perfect title to an area defined by
color of title. However, it must be kept in mind that an adverse
claimant can possess through a tenant, lessee or agent and that
the possessions of vendor and vendee, grantor and grantee can be
combined or "tacked" to show combined adverse possession for
the required statutory period.14
To effectively vest title, adverse possession must continue for
the applicable statutory period. This rule might not require
open, actual possession for each day of the statutory period, but
it does require such continuity of possession as to give the true
owner a cause of action against the adverse claimant at all times
during the statutory period.15
Whether or not an adverse possessor has color of title will af-
fect the extent and validity of the adverse possession. Color of
title, while not effective to pass or vest title, purports to do so and
is valid upon its face. Generally, this results when the one who
creates the color of title has no true title and cannot create a true
11 Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711,713 (Ky. 1966); D.B. Frampton &
Co. v. Saulsberry, 286 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ky. 1954); Porter v. Posey, 592 S.W.2d at 849;
Leakev. Richardson, 103 S.E.2d 2M7, 234 (Va. 1958).
12 Cowherd v. Brooks, 456 S.W.2d at 829; McCoy v. Kentucky & W. Va. Gas Co.,
226 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Ky. 1950); Somon v. Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., 232
S.E.2d at 528-30.
13 Lyle v. Holman, 238 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Ky. 1951); Bauer v. Bush, 193 N.E.2d
529, 531 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Somon v. Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., 232
S.E.2d at 529.
14 Kerlin v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., 390 So. 2d 616, 619-20 (Ala. 1980) (ten-
ants); Martin v. Kane, 245 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Ky. 1952) (tacking); Arrowood v. Williams,
586 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (tacking); Mahunda v. Thomas, 402 S.W.2d
405, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (tenants); State v. Davis, 83 S.E.2d 114, 125 (W. Va.
1954) (tacking).
Is Noland v. Wise, 259 S.W.2d at 48; Thompson v. Ratcliff, 245 S.W.2d 592,592-93
(Ky. 1952); Stonev. Conder, 264 S.E.2d 760, 765 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
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title. 16 Color of title may result from inadvertence, mistake or de-
liberate manufacture.17 It must be in writing, purport to pass
title and contain an adequate description of the real estate.",
An adverse claimant in possession without color of title can
perfect title by adverse possession only to the real estate actually
possessed or enclosed within such actual possession. 19 Thus, an
adverse possessor in actual adverse possession of only one acre of
a ten-acre tract can acquire title to no more than the one acre ac-
tually possessed. However, if the adverse possessor has color of
title, the doctrine of "constructive possession" applies. The doc-
trine of constructive possession, as applied to adverse possession,
usually extends the effect of the actual adverse possession to the
outer limits of the land described in the color of title document. 20
One must keep in mind the limitations on the application of
the doctrine of constructive possession. First, color of title will
not extend constructive possession to lands outside those de-
scribed in the color of title document.21 Second, color of title will
not extend constructive possession to any part of land which is in
the actual possession of the true owner,2 since a true owner in
possession is said to possess constructively all of the land not ac-
tually possessed by an adverse claimantEI Third, actual posses-
16 Adams v. Severt, 252 S.E.2d 276, 279 (N.C. App. 1979); Wallace v. McPherson,
214 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tenn. 1947); Somon v. Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., 232
S.E.2d at 529.
17 Fife v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 1951); Van Meter v. Grice, 380 So.
2d 274, 280-81 (Ala. 1980).
18 See Martin v. Kentucky & W. Va. Gas Co., 401 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Ky. 1965); J.
Walter Wright Lumber Co. v. Baker, 395 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Ky. 1965); Peterson v.
Harpst, 247 S.W.2d 663, 666-67 (Mo. 1952).
19 Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d at 713; Shepherd v. Morgan, 246
S.W.2d 131, 132 (Ky. 1951); Rogers v. Burnopp, 283 A.2d 367, 371 (Md. 1971); Somon v.
Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., 232 S.E.2d at 529.
20 Shepherd v. Morgan, 246 S.W.2d at 132; Goen v. Sansbury, 149 A.2d at 20-21;
Teson v. Vasquez, 561 S.W.2d 119, 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Somon v. Murphy Fabrica-
tion and Erection Co., 232 S.E.2d at 529.
21 Teson v. Vasquez, 561 S.W.2d at 126-27; Burns v. Crump, 95 S.E.2d 906, 909
(N.C. 1957).
' Lyons v. Bassford, 249 S.E.2d 255, 259 (Ga. 1978); Big Run Coal & Clay Co. v.
Helton, 323 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ky. 1959); Harmon v. Lowe, 219 S.W.2d 982, 983 (Ky.
1949); Inn Le'Daerda, Inc. v. Davis, 360 A.2d 209, 213-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). See
Moore v. Brannan, 304 S.W.2d 660, 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).
23 King v. United States, 585 F.2d 1213, 1217 (4th Cir. 1978); Garrison Furniture
[Vol. 71
ADVERSE POSSESSION
sion by an adverse claimant will not extend constructively to
lands owned by a different person upon whose land the actual
adverse possession is occurring. 24 For example, an adverse claim-
ant with color of title to an adequately described 100-acre tract
made up of two or more separately owned tracts, but whose ac-
tual possession is confined to one of those tracts, can only acquire
title by constructive possession to the tract which was actually
possessed.2e The rationale is simple. Possession on Tract A does
not give the owner of Tract B any notice of a claim adverse to
ownership of B and does not give the owner of B any possessory
cause of action against the adverse possessor who does not actual-
ly possess any part of B.
Thus, at least two elements must be present during the appli-
cable statute of limitations period for adverse possession to be ef-
fective to take title from a true owner and vest it in an adverse
claimant: (1) the adverse claimant must do such acts as will give
the true owner notice of the adverse claim,2 and (2) the acts must
give rise to a cause of action by the true owner to oust the adverse
claimant from possession. This leads to consideration of at least
two special but common sets of circumstances. The first is where
one party is the owner of a life estate in real estate and another
party is the owner of the remainder estate. Actual possession and
use of the surface of the land is adverse to the life tenant's title
and gives a possessory cause of action to the life tenant. 28 How-
ever, such surface use and possession, even under color of title to
Co. v. Southern Enter., Inc., 436 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. 1969); Inn Le'Daerda, Inc. v.
Davis, 360 A.2d at 214.
24 Moore v. Musa, 198 So. 2d 843, 847-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Creech v.
Miniard, 408 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Ky. 1965). See Chilton v. White, 78 S.E. 1048, 1050 (W.
Va. 1913).
25 McCoy v. Anthony Land Co., 322 S.W.2d 439, 440-41 (Ark. 1959); Morehead v.
Harris, 137 S.E.2d 174, 181 (N.C. 1964); Cheek v. Lange, 209 S.E.2d 520, 522 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1974). See United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d at 103 ("The severance of the min-
eral interests here divided the total interest in the land into separate estates just as truly as
if the land had been divided into separate tracts.").
2 Porter v. Posey, 592 S.W.2d at 849; Curtis Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc. v. John-
son, 200 S.E.2d 542, 545 (Va. 1973); Somon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection Co., 232
S.E.2d at 528-29.
27 Noland v. Wise, 259 S.W.2d at 48; State v. Moore, 76 S.E. 461, 463 (W. Va.
1912). SSee United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d at 103.
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fee ownership, is not notice to the separate owner of the re-
mainder estate of any adverse claim to his or her ownership.2
Nor does it give the remainderman a possessory or other cause of
action against the surface possessor.3° However, if the surface
possessor, or other possessor, begins extracting minerals from the
land, those acts are beyond the right of the life tenarit. They give
the remainder estate owner notice of acts adverse to his or her
ownership and also give rise to a cause of action to prevent such
possession (extraction) of the subsurface minerals. 3
The second special situation exists with respect to land
owned by co-tenants. Mere use by one co-tenant without con-
sumption of the land is not a trespass against the nonusing co-
tenant32 Nor does it constitute notice of a claim adverse to the
ownership of the nonusing co-tenant or give rise to a cause of ac-
tion against the using co-tenant.A3 However, if one co-tenant
gives adequate notice to the other co-tenant of a claim to the
whole estate, that co-tenant's exclusive possession thereafter can
be held to be adverse to the co-owner and full title can be per-
fected by such adverse possession.A4 Thus, the extraction of
minerals by only one co-tenant under claim of right to full
ownership of the mineral title would be adverse to the ownership
of the other co-tenant, giving the other co-tenant a cause of ac-
tion against the one who is extracting and depleting the corpus of
theland.
29 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d at 103; Piel v. Dewitt, 351 N.E.2d 48, 55
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976); McDonald v. Burke, 288 S.W.2d 363, 365-66 (Ky. 1955). See
Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 299 (1958).
30 Piel v. Dewitt, 351 N.E.2d at 55; Field v. Lloyd, 453 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Ky. 1970);
Ritchie v. Paine, 431 S.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Ky. 1968); Stealey v. Lyons, 37 S.E.2d 569, 576
(W. Va. 1946).31 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 298 F.2d 163, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 825 (1962); Givens v. Givens, 387 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Ky. 1965); Miller v.
Bowen Coal & Mining Co., 40 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
32 Thaxtonv. Beard, 201 S.E.2d 298,303 (W. Va. 1973).
33 Daugherty v. Breeding, 553 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Ky. 1977); Cary-Glenden Coal Co.
v. Warren, 198 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Ky. 1946); Rutledge v. Rutledge, 132 S.E.2d 469, 474-
75 (Va. 1963).
34 Jenks v. Jenks, 294 So. 2d 147, 150-51 (Ala. 1974); Johnstone v. Johnson, 248 So.
2d 444, 448 (Miss. 1971); Collier v. Welker, 199 S.E.2d 691, 694 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
a5 Nevling v. Natoli, 434 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Dotson v. Branham,
90 S.E.2d 783, 786-87 (Va. 1956); Thaxton v. Beard, 201 S.E.2d at 303. The extraction of
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The foregoing is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion
of all aspects of adverse possession of land. It does highlight most
of the basic adverse possession issues and serves as background for
the following discussions which are directed to specific issues in-
volving adverse possession of subsurface minerals, both before
and after severance of title.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION OF SUBSURFACE MINERALS
A. No Severance of Titles
1. Actual Possession of Surface Only
Assume that a tract of land, including subsurface minerals, is
owned in fee simple by one true owner (or a group of common
owners). Then assume that a stranger to the true owner's title en-
ters into actual possession of part of the surface of that tract
under claim of ownership; while in actual possession, the
stranger performs acts which will qualify him or her as a full ad-
verse possessor, thus entitling him or her to a perfected new title
at the expiration of the applicable statutory period. The issue
here is the extent to which such an adverse possessor will be able
to acquire and perfect title to subsurface minerals.
If the adverse possessor has no color of title to the land, sur-
face or minerals, the general principles of the law of adverse pos-
session of real estate apply. The adverse possessor will acquire fee
title to that part of the surface and to the minerals underlying
that part of the surface, actually and adversely possessed. 36 The
extent of active possession will define the areas of the claim. To
that extent, the adverse possessor will be deemed to have pos-
sessed the subsurface minerals along with surface possession and
will perfect title to those subsurface minerals. 37
If the adverse possessor of the surface has good color of title,
his or her actual possession of the surface or a part thereof will be
minerals by a co-tenant constitutes waste, which, by statute in most jurisdictions, can be
prohibited by nonconsenting co-tenants. See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 993, 997 (1919), supple-
mented in Annot., 41 A.L.R. 582 (1926) (timber).
36 Hellier Coal & Coke Co. v. Bowling, 272 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Ky. 1954); Interstate
Coal & Iron Co. v. Clintwood Coal & Timber Co., 54 S.E. 593,598-99 (Va. 1906).
37 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d at 103.
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extended constructively to the outer bounds of a color of title un-
less such constructive possession is otherwise restricted."8 If the
adverse possessor is in actual possession of the surface only and
the color of title purports to give a good fee title to the true
owner's whole tract (provided that possession is open, hostile, ex-
clusive and continuous for the required statutory period) the ad-
verse possessor can perfect title to the surface and the subsurface
minerals underlying the same surface.3 But if the true owner is in
actual possession of any part of the surface, the adverse posses-
sor's color of title is ineffective to extend surface possession, and
the adverse possessor will perfect title only to that part of the sur-
face actually in his or her exclusive possession. However, the ad-
verse possessor will perfect title to the subsurface minerals under-
lying the surface area actually possessed. 4
When the claimant possesses the surface under color of title
to the fee ownership and the true owner has no actual possession
of any part of the surface but has actual possession of one or more
of the subsurface minerals, e.g., underground mining of subsur-
face solid minerals from an entry on another tract, that actual
possession of subsurface minerals by the true owner will prevent
the surface possession of the adverse claimant from extending
constructively to subsurface minerals. Therefore, the adverse
surface possession will perfect title to the surface only and not to
the subsurface minerals.41
Any surface possession by the true owner related to conduct-
ing mineral extraction activities, such as constructing a road or
well site, drilling an oil and gas well, equipping a producing well
and laying pipelines to handle production, not only would pre-
vent the adverse surface possessor from acquiring title to subsur-
face minerals on the tract, but also would constitute surface pos-
session by the true owner so as to destroy any constructive posses-
sion of the surface. The surface possession by the adverse claim-
38 See Hunsley v. Valter, 147 N.E.2d 356, 356, 360 (Ml. 1958).
'9 Whittington v. Cameron, 52 N.E.2d 134, 137-38 (IIl. 1943); Hellier Coal & Coke
v. Bowling, 272 S.W.2d at 652-53. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 124, §§ 3-10 (1954).
40 Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U.S. 333, 368 (1880); Paepcke v. Kirkman, 55 F.2d 814,
815 (5th Cir. 1932); Vance v. Guy, 31 S.E.2d 766, 768 (N.C. 1944) rev'g 27 S.E.2d 117
(N.C. 1943); Inn Le'Daerda v. Davis, 360 A.2d at 213-14.
41 Brennan v. Pine Hill Collieries, Inc., 167 A. 776, 777 (Pa. 1933).
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ant would not be exclusive, and the constructive possession by
the true owner from such surface activities would extend to any
part of the tract not actually possessed by the adverse claimant. 42
It also follows that any constructive possession of subsurface
minerals by an adverse claimant who possesses the surface only,
even though under color of title to the fee, is ineffective against
one who actually possesses any subsurface minerals but is not the
true owner. 3 In this situation, the stranger's possession of the
minerals prevents constructive possession established by adverse
possession of the surface from being exclusive. Thus, title to all
the subsurface minerals could not be perfected by actual posses-
sion of the surface only.
Even though the true owner has not severed the surface
ownership from the subsurface mineral ownership, an adverse
-claimant who possesses the surface under color of title which
purports to give surface ownership only cannot perfect title to
subsurface minerals by such surface possession. This results be-
cause the color of title does not extend to subsurface minerals and
the surface possession cannot extend by constructive possession to
subsurface minerals whose ownership is outside the scope of the
color of title.44
2. Actual Possession of Minerals Only
Assuming that a tract of land is owned in fee with no sep-
arate ownership of surface and minerals by one owner or a group
of common owners, and the owner or owners do not actually pos-
sess any part of the land, either surface or minerals, can title to
the subsurface minerals be perfected by only such adverse posses-
sion of the surface as is incidental to actual possession by mining
or other extractions of the subsurface minerals? The answer is a
well settled "yes." 45 However, there must be actual possession of
42 Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U.S. at 368; Vance v. Guy, 31 S.E.2d at 768. See 3 AM.
JuR.2d Adverse Possession §S 50-53 (1962 & Supp. 1981).
43 Collins v. Smith, 372 P.2d 878, 881 (Okla. 1962); Diem v. Diem, 372 P.2d 19, 23
(Okla. 1962).
44 McCoy v. Lowrie, 253 P.2d 415, 417 (Wash. 1953); White Flame Coal Co. v.
Burgess, 102 S.E. 690, 692 (W. Va. 1920).
45 See, e.g., Diederich v. Ware, 298 S.W.2d 643, 645-47 (Ky. 1956); Thompson v.
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the subsurface minerals in such a manner and for such a period of
time as will satisfy all the elements required for adverse posses-
sion. 46 As a practical and legal matter it would seem that there
also must be some evidence on the surface of mining, extraction
or other actual possession of subsurface minerals before it can be
asserted that the true owner has obtained or can be charged with
notice of any claim adverse to ownership of the subsurface min-
erals. 47 Actual possession of subsurface minerals necessarily con-
templates some extraction activities, whether they are mining
solid mineral substances or drilling for and producing gaseous or
liquid mineral substances.48
If such actual possession is not under some color of title, it is
difficult for the adverse claimant to obtain title to any part of the
minerals in place; the mere act of extraction converts the mineral
substance from real property to personal property, and actual
possession of the mineral existed only so long as the extraction
process was being performed.49 Under a strict view, one can
argue that the adverse possessor without color of title is never
more than a trespasser and the true owner will not lose title to
any minerals still in place; instead, the true owner will have a
cause of action in tort against the adverse possessor for damages
done to the real estate or, under an implied contract theory, an
action to recover the value of the minerals removed within the
applicable statute of limitations period.0° However, successful
arguments might be made that mining activities carried on for
the statutory period in an area defined by the mining activities
will perfect title to the minerals remaining in place within the
Ratcliff, 245 S.W.2d 592, 592-94 (Ky. 1952); Ball v. Autry, 427 P.2d 424, 426-28 (Okla.
1966); Thomas v. Young, 117 S.E. 909, 911-12 (W. Va. 1923). See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d
124, § 11 (1954).
46 Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 141 N.E. 537, 541-42 (IMI. 1923);
Thompson v. Ratcliff, 245 S.W.2d at 592-94; Stark v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 88 A. 770,
771 (Pa. 1913); Lloyd v. Mills, 69 S.E. 1094, 1095-97 (W. Va. 1911).
47 Brizzolara v. Powell, 218 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Ark. 1949); Stark v. Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 88 A. at 771; Thomas v. Young, 117 S.E. at 910-11.
48 Payne v. Williams, 414 N.E.2d 836, 841 (1M. App. Ct. 1980); Thomas v. Young,
117 S.E. at 913: Lockwood v. Carter Oil Co., 80 S.E. 814, 817 (W. Va. 1913).
49 See White v. Miller, 139 N.Y.S. 660 (App. Div. 1912).
50 See Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 79 .S.W.2d 394 (Ky. 1934); Blacksburg Mining
& Mfg. v. Bell, 100 S.E. 806 (Va. 1919).
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area so defined.5' It also has been indicated that adverse posses-
sion by the establishment of oil and gas well operations without
color of title will perfect title to the oil and gas in place within the
area that can be drained by the adverse claimant's well or wells. 2
Perhaps a result more consistent with the law of adverse posses-
sion would give the adverse oil and gas well possessor only the
right to continue production using the same well location and re-
lated appurtenances but would not give perfected title or owner-
ship in any oil and gas in place. If the adverse claimant perfects
title to oil and gas in place within the drainage area of the well,
the true owner will be prevented from drilling into the same
drainage area; but if the adverse claimant perfects only a right to
maintain the adverse well, the true owner could not be pre-
vented from drilling an offset well into the same drainage area.
If an adverse possessor of only subsurface minerals possesses
with color of title and general principles of the law of adverse
possession of real estate are followed, then the adverse possessor
might be able to perfect title to the minerals in place to the extent
of the color of title. 0 Also, if one true owner owns surface and all
subsurface minerals in fee, actual possession of one mineral by an
adverse claimant under color of title to all minerals might per-
fect the adverse claimant's title to all minerals.4 The same re-
sult follows if a true owner owns all minerals but no surface and
an adverse claimant possesses only one mineral but has color of
title to all minerals. However, if the subsurface minerals are sep-
arately owned, or if the adverse possessor's color of title is limited
to only one or specified minerals less than all, the title perfected
will be limited, depending upon true ownership of the minerals,
color of possession and actual possession.-, For example, actual
adverse possession of coal accompanied by color of title to the
51 See Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 141 N.E. at 542; Piney Oil &
Gas Co. v. Scott, 79 S.W.2d at 400.52 See Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d at 646-47.
53 See Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. v. Bell, 100 S.E. 806 (Va. 1919); White Flame
Coal Co. v. Burgess, 102 S.E. at 690. See also Lee, Working Part of a Mineral Estate as
Adverse Possession of the Whole, 46 Ky. L.J. 67 (1957-58).
54 Cf. Hollman v. Johnson, 80 S.E. 249 (N.C. 1913) (true owner of only the surface
but, under color of title to minerals, successfully adversely possessed all minerals by actual
possession of only one mineral).
'5 See Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Sewell, 249 F. 840 (6th Cir. 1918).
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coal, oil and gas should not adversely affect the true owner's title
to any of the other minerals.
Limitations on the extent of constructive possession that ac-
companies actual possession apply to subsurface minerals in the
same way as to real estate generally. Therefore, actual and exclu-
sive possession by an adverse claimant of subsurface minerals
under color of title will not be extended beyond the area of actual
possession if the true owner also is in actual possession of any part
of the same minerals. 5 Further, actual possession of subsurface
minerals under color of title to a larger area will not be extended
by construction to any part of the same tract of minerals actually
being possessed by any other adverse possessor. 5
B. Severance of Titles by the True Owner
For purposes of this discussion, a severance of titles exists
when the paper title to the surface of a tract of land is held by one
owner or claimant and the paper title to subsurface minerals is
held by another owner or claimant. In addition, severance can
occur when paper title to only one or more minerals, but not all,
is held by one owner and the paper title to other subsurface min-
erals is held by another, with or without actual or claimed
ownership of any part of the surface of the same land.
1. Possession of Surface Only
It is universally held that, after surface ownership has been
severed from ownership of subsurface minerals, an adverse pos-
sessor who commences possession of the surface of land and limits
possession to such surface possession shall not be deemed to be in
possession of the subsurface minerals, regardless of the surface
possessor's color of title. No matter how long such surface posses-
sion continues, it will not take title from the true owner of the
minerals. ;8 It does not matter whether the adverse possessor of
56 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
5j See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
'8 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d at 102; Knott Coal Corp. v. Kelly, 417




the surface has notice or knowledge of the prior severance of the
surface and mineral titles by the true owner. 9 This principle and
the cases supporting it are consistent with rules of law applicable
to adverse possession of real estate generally.
Surface possession by the adverse claimant is notice to the
owner of the possessor's claim and gives to the surface owner a
possessory cause of action; it is not notice to the subsurface min-
eral owner of any adverse claim to his or her title, and surface
possession alone does not provide a separate mineral owner with
a possessory cause of action against the surface possessor. 0 Fur-
ther, even though the surface possessor may have good color of
title to the subsurface minerals, possession of the surface only
will not be extended constructively to the underlying minerals
owned by one other than the owner of the surface. 61
In Kentucky, after the surface and mineral titles have been
severed, the owner in possession of the surface is said to hold pos-
session of the subsurface minerals as trustee for the true subsur-
face mineral owner. 6 This rule results from the provisions in a
Kentucky statute6 on this subject. However, the net results of the
Kentucky cases are consistent with holdings in other jurisdic-
tions.
If an adverse claimant commences adverse possession prior to
the severance of the surface and mineral titles by the true owner
and such adverse possession is confined to surface possession only,
but is not restricted by color of title to surface only, then con-
tinued possession for the required statutory period will perfect
title to the surface and subsurface minerals in spite of a severance
59 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d at 102.
60 Id. at 103. See Payne v. Williams, 414 N.E.2d at 842; Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81,
82 (Ky. 1919).
61 Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College, 184 N.E. 213, 216 (III. 1932). See Asher v.
Gibson, 248 S.W. 862,866 (Ky. 1923).6 2 Ward v. Woods, 310 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Ky. 1958); Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d
at 645; Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 79 S.W.2d at 397. See Comment, Breaking the
Trust: Adverse Possession of Subsurface Minerals Under Kentucky Law in this issue of the
Kentucky Law Journal for an extensive discussion of Kentucky's treatment of the surface
owner as trustee for the subsurface minerals owner.




of titles by the true owner.64 This is the result in the majority of
the jurisdictions that have considered the matter.65 It is consistent
with the law of adverse possession of real estate as generally ap-
plied-possession of the surface is constructively extended to sub-
surface minerals, no part of which is actually possessed by the
true owner. The mere subdivision of the true owner's title and
ownership unaccompanied by actual possession by the true
owner or his or her grantee does not amount to an ouster of the
adverse possessor. Under these facts, it also seems that the true
owner of the minerals after severance would have a possessory
cause of action against the adverse surface possessor because,
under the circumstances, the surface possession is adverse to the
mineral owner.
Perkins v. Southern Coal Corp. 6 indicates that a contrary re-
sult might be obtained. The court in Perkins seems to say that,
after a severance is effected by the true owner, no amount of sur-
face possession is adverse to the title of the separate owner of the
subsurface minerals. However, the statements of the court in the
Perkins case appear to be dicta only and the authority cited by
the court as the basis for its dicta does not support the court's
stated conclusion.67
2. Possession of a Mineral or Minerals Only
Assuming that there has been a severance of surface and min-
eral titles prior to the commencement of any adverse possession
of the surface, no amount of adverse possession of the surface
only will perfect title to the underlying minerals in the surface
possessor. However, it is possible that the separate owner of a
mineral or minerals can lose title to an adverse possessor. 8 To ac-
quire title to the subsurface minerals by adverse possession, an
r4 Ates v. Yellow Pine Land Co., 310 So. 2d 772, 773-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Wallace v. Neal, 11 S.W.2d 1002, 1003 (Ky. 1928); Cargill v. Buie, 343 S.W.2d 746, 750
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
65 See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 124, § 20 (1954).
6' 96 F. Supp. 8, 13 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
67 Case Comment, Adverse Possession-Effect of Severance of Minerals After Ad-
verse Possession Commenced, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 76 (1951-52).
68 Vorhes v. Dennison, 189 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Ky. 1945). See Piney Oil & Gas Co. v.
Scott, 79 S.W.2d at 394; Smith v. Pittston Co., 124 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1962).
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adverse claimant must satisfy all the elements necessary for per-
fection of title by adverse possession.6 The claimant must actual-
ly possess the subsurface minerals under circumstances that will
give the true owner notice of the adverse claim and a possessory
cause of action against the adverse claimant. 70
If all subsurface minerals are owned by one owner and the
adverse possessor has no color of title, the adverse possessor
probably cannot perfect title to any subsurface minerals in place;
at most, the adverse possessor's extraction of minerals gives the
true owner a cause of action in tort or under an implied contract
theory. However, if the adverse possessor had good color of title,
actual possession of any particular subsurface mineral or min-
erals is extended by construction to all subsurface minerals. 71 For
example, actual adverse possession of coal only as against an
owner of the coal, oil, gas and other minerals may be extended
by construction to the oil, gas and other minerals if the color of
title of the adverse claimant covers the coal, oil, gas and other
minerals. Presumably, actual possession of only one mineral puts
the true owner on notice of an adverse claim to the entire min-
eral ownership, not just notice as to the one mineral actually be-
ing possessed.72 On the other hand, if subsurface minerals are
owned by separate owners, actual possession of only one mineral
does not constitute notice to the other owners of an adverse claim
to their respective ownerships nor does it give them a possessory
or other cause of action against the adverse possessor. 73
It is arguable that one who has no true title to oil and gas but
who possesses, or attempts to possess oil and gas, commits a tres-
pass against the owner of the surface and any subsurface strata
9 Letcher County Coal & Improvement Co. v. Marlowe, 398 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Ky.
1965) (quoting Vorhes v. Dennison, 189 S.W.2d at 271); Mohoma Oil Co. v. Ambassador
Oil Corp., 474 P.2d 950, 960 (Okla. 1970).
70 Mohoma Oil Co. v. Ambassador Oil Corp., 474 P.2d at 960; Hassel v. Texaco,
Inc., 372 P.2d 233, 235 (Okla. 1962); Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 52 S.E. 485, 487
(W. Va. 1905). See Vorhes v. Dennison, 189 S.W.2d at 271 (occasional mining insuffi-
cient).
71 See Hollman v. Johnson, 80 S.E. at 249. Cf. Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d at
647 (principle applied to fugacious minerals).
72 See notes 20, 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
73 Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Sewell, 249 F. at 848. See Piney Oil & Gas
Co. v. Scott, 79 S.W.2d at 394.
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penetrated in the course of drilling and maintaining an oil and
gas well. If such trespass is continued for the required statutory
period, the owner of the surface and penetrated subsurface strata
will have allowed the adverse claimant to establish surface and
subsurface easements by prescription, 74 even though the adverse
possessor will not have acquired any fee title to the surface or
subsurface strata by the drilling and producing activities. 75
C. When "Severance" Is By Adverse Claimant
If one not the true owner of a tract of land claims title under
good color of title and purports to separate this "title" to the sur-
face and subsurface minerals by a grant of the minerals prior to
actual possession of any part of the land, the purported severance
is not a true severance. 7 After such an ineffective severance, pos-
session of the surface only by the adverse claimant will amount to
constructive possession of the subsurface minerals and will per-
fect title to both surface and minerals if such surface possession
qualifies as true adverse possession and satisfies the required sta-
tutory period." The title of the mineral grantee will be perfected
by the doctrine of estoppel by deed since the adverse claimant's
perfected title will relate back to the original entry. The original
entry will have been made prior to the grant, and the after-ac-
quired title will serve to feed a grant of the minerals. 78 The fact
that the adverse possessor goes into possession of the surface un-
der what purports to be a title relating to surface only (because of
a prior purported grant of the minerals) does not restrict the pos-
74 For cases relating generally to prescriptive easements, see Georgia Power Co. v.
Gibson, 173 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1973); Lyle v. Holman, 238 S.W.2d at 157; Berkeley Dev.
Corp. v. Hutzler, 299 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976); Town of Paden City v. Felton, 66
S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1951).
75 See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
76 See Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. v. Brewer, 92 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1937), (noted in
Recent Decisions, Adverse Possession-Severance of Minerals and Surface-Adverse Pos-
session as Affecting Title to the Minerals, 37 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1938-39)); Kilpatrick v.
Gulf Prod. Co., 139 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Stoebuck, Adverse Possession of
Severable Minerals, 68 W. VA. L. REv. 274 (1966).
77 See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
78 See Tennessee Coal, Iron & By. v. Brewer, 92 F.2d at 804; American Petrofina,
Inc. v. Warren, 156 So. 2d 729 (Miss. 1963); Stoebuck, supra note 76, at 279.
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sessor's color of title and claim of title to surface only, because the
true color of title is the purported title prior to the ineffective
severance. 9
The case is much clearer if the adverse possessor who com-
mences possession of the surface under good color of title to fee
ownership thereafter purports to sever the surface and mineral
titles by a grant or reservation. Assuming there was no severance
by the true owner prior to the time the adverse claimant com-
menced surface possession, it is universally held that continued
possession of the surface by the original adverse claimant or his or
her grantee will perfect title to surface and minerals against the
true owner of both. 0
If there is no surface possession by an adverse claimant or if
such possession is not continued for the required statutory period,
a grantee of the minerals from an adverse claimant without true
title can perfect title to the subsurface minerals only by actual
possession of such minerals. He or she may use the adverse claim-
ant's void grant as color of title to extend by construction the ac-
tual possession of subsurface minerals.81 Apparently, adverse pos-
session of the surface by an adverse claimant who also is a pur-
ported grantor of the minerals and whose possession is effective
as to subsurface minerals can be tacked to the actual possession of
his or her grantee. Tacking the grantor's interest to that of the
grantee's for the required statutory period allows the mineral
grantee to perfect title to the minerals even though surface pos-
session has not been sufficient to allow any one adverse claimant
to individually perfect title to the surface. 2
D. Adverse Possession by Co-Owner
Special attention must be given to those cases where a true
co-owner of real estate attempts to acquire full ownership of
property by adverse possession as against co-owners and the
79 See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
80 See Pierson v. Case, 133 So. 2d 239, 243-44 (Ala. 1961); Wallace v. Neal, 11
S.W.2d at 1003; Temples v. First Nat'l Bank of Laurel, 123 So. 2d 852, 856 (Miss. 1960);
Kilpatrick v. Gulf Prod. Co., 139 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
81 See notes 45-48, 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
82 See notes 14, 38-40, 43 supra and accompanying text.
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world. As a general rule, the mere possession or use of real estate
by one co-owner is not adverse to the ownership of co-owners.A3
This is true whether the possessing co-owner is an original co-
owner or whether the possessing co-owner is a grantee of one or
more, but less than all, co-owners. 84
It is well settled that one co-owner can acquire full title by
adverse possession if the right combination of facts and circum-
stances exists. 5 First, there must be some act or acts amounting
to an ouster of all other co-owners.86 Second, the fact of the ous-
ter and the claim of full ownership must be brought to the atten-
tion of the other co-owners either by actual notice or by some act
or acts that amount to notice. 87 The ouster, claim and notice are
much more difficult to accomplish when an original co-owner
seeks to establish full title by adverse possession against others
who acquired title with the adverse claimant. One of the prob-
lems of such an original owner is lack of color of title to full
ownership. The cases demonstrate that a clearer case can be
made if one co-owner purports to grant full ownership to a party;
the grantee thereby obtains and goes into possession under color
of title to full ownership. m
If surface and mineral titles have not been severed and the
adverse claimant possesses and uses the surface only, he or she
can perfect title to subsurface minerals in the same manner and
to the same extent as has been previously discussed with respect
to surface possession by a stranger to the true title. However, in
the case of a co-owner in possession of the surface only, but under
claim of full title, the acts of surface possession and any other acts
83 Ramey v. Ramey, 353 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Ky. 1962); Cary-Glendon Coal Co. v.
Warren, 198 S.W.2d 499,501 (Ky. 1946). See generally Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 5 (1962).
84 See, e.g., Hoagland v. Fish, 238 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Ky. 1951).
85 See Ramey v. Ramey, 353 S.W.2d at 191; Dixon v. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d 869
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
8 See Gill v. Fletcher, 78 N.E. 433 (Ohio 1906); Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 547 P.2d 1240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), affd, 558 P.2d 186 (Wash. 1977).
87 Pan Mutual Royalties v. Williams, 365 P.2d 138, 140 (Okla. 1961); Brooks v.
Shaw, 159 S.W.2d 206, 209-10 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 547 P.2d at 1252-53.
8 See Saulsberry v. Maddix, 125 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 643
(1942); Laing v. Gauley Coal Land Co., 153 S.E. 577 (W. Va. 1930); 3 AM. Jun.2d Ad-
verse Possession § 174 (1962).
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must be such as to amount to an ouster of and notice to the co-
owners in order to perfect a full title.8 Whether there has been
an ouster and sufficient notice is largely a question of fact. How-
ever, it seems that the extraction of minerals by an adverse pos-
sessing co-owner amounts to waste, which is beyond the right of
a co-owner in possession. Such acts of waste committed without
accounting to the other co-owners for their respective shares of
the products or proceeds therefrom are good evidence of acts of
ouster and claim of full ownership; they could very well provide
notice to other co-owners of the possessor's claim of full owner-
ship. 0
The same principles apply when surface and mineral titles
are severed and the minerals are owned by co-owners. As pre-
viously noted, to acquire title to subsurface minerals by adverse
possession there must be some actual possession of the minerals.
This requires actual extraction of minerals, openly and for the
prescribed statutory period. The mineral extraction process con-
stitutes acts evidencing full ownership and affords notice to other
co-owners of a claim of full ownership. 91
E. Adverse Possession Against Remainder Interests
As a general proposition, when land is owned by successive
owners, the life tenant is entitled to possession and use of the land
for the duration of the life estate, and the remainderman has no
right of possession until termination of the life estate.92 Conse-
quently, mere possession of land by the life tenant is not posses-
sion which is adverse to the title of the remainderman, nor is it
notice to the remainderman of an adverse claim. The remainder-
man has no cause of action which would start the running of the
applicable statute of limitations. 93 The same is generally held to
89 Cary-Glendon Coal Co. v. Warren, 198 S.W.2d at 500; Dixon v. Henderson, 267
S.W.2d at 872; Russell v. Tennant, 60 S.E. 609, 613 (W. Va. 1908). See 3 AM. Jun.2d Ad-
verse Possession § 174 (1962).
9o See Dixon v. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d at 869.
91 See notes 46-47supra and accompanyingtext.
92 See generally 51 AM. JuR.2d Life Tenants and Remaindermen § 27 (1970) and
cases cited therein.
93 McDonald v. Burke, 288 S.W.2d 363, 365-66 (Ky. 1955); Barnett v. Barnett, 142
S.W.2d 975, 977 (Ky. 1940); Stealey v. Lyons, 37 S.E.2d 569, 576 (W. Va. 1946).
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be true even though a stranger to the true title possesses the sur-
face, for there is no act adverse to the title of the remainderman,
no notice of an adverse claim and no cause of action accruing to
the remainderman.94
However, if a life tenant or an adversely possessing stranger
does more than possess and use the surface of land, for example,
extract minerals, then they commit acts outside the scope of
ownership of a life tenant and give notice of an adverse claim to
full ownership, thereby giving to the remainderman a cause of
action for waste.95 Thus, the actual extraction of minerals by a
life tenant, or by a stranger to the true title, evidences actual pos-
session of the minerals, constitutes waste as to the remainder-
man, puts the remainderman on notice of a claim adverse to his
or her ownership and gives the remainderman a cause of action
against the trespasser.9" Under these circumstances, the remain-
derman must act to protect his or her ownership within the time
allowed by the applicable statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that concepts ap-
plicable to adverse possession of subsurface minerals are gen-
erally the same as those that apply to adverse possession of all
real estate. However, one must be aware of special requirements
that must be satisfied in order to perfect title to subsurface min-
erals by adverse possession, particularly when there has been a
severance of the true title between surface and subsurface min-
erals.
The perfection of good title by adverse possession serves
many useful purposes in the law. In those jurisdictions where
senior and junior grants came from the state or commonwealth
covering the same or some of the same land and in those areas
where descriptions of land were vague or not carefully drawn,
94 See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
95 See note 31 supra and accompanying text. See also 3 AMJuR.2d Adverse Posses-
sion §§ 226, 227 (1962).
96 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 298 F.2d at 168-69; Rupel v. Ohio Oil
Co., 95 N.E. 225, 226 (Ind. 1911); Moore v. Vines, 474 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. 1971). See
78 AM. Jua.2d Waste § 24 (1975).
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adverse possession serves to solidify land and mineral ownership.
Further, there may be some public, social and economic justifi-
cation in rewarding, with good title, those who take possession
and use real estate for its intended use, including the extraction
of subsurface minerals.

